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1 Introduction
Economic growth can generally explain a transformation of payment choice over time. Growth
in Mexico, however, was not high enough to cause a switch from cash towards electronic means
of payment observed in the data after 2001. We argue that the switch towards electronic
payments can be attributed to openness and related payment technology spillovers from the
US in the context of NAFTA.
The way in which economic transactions are settled, or paid, depends on consumersand
merchantsdecisions and on the availability of alternative payment methods. The continuous
evolution of information technology has led to a signicant transformation of payments industry
giving economic agents the possibility of choosing among a greater number of payment arrange-
ments (Evans and Schmalensse, 2009). Further, the adoption of new payment instruments, and
e-money in particular, contributes to cash substitution and the development of more e¢ cient
payment and banking systems (Stojanovic, 2001). Financial and banking development is not
globally homogeneous. Accordingly, the distribution and evolution of payment instruments use
is usually very di¤erent across countries, even within developed ones (see Callado and Utrero,
2004). Humphrey et al. (1996) highlight that institutional and cultural di¤erences (income,
new payment instruments, etc.) modify the use of cash. Together with these, the degree of
economic development is one of the main factors that positively a¤ect the use of electronic
means of payments, see for example Ireland (1994), Hromcová (2008) or Humphrey (2010).
At the same time, openness to international exchange is claimed to contribute to countries
dynamic performance, Grossman and Helpman (1991), McGrattan and Prescott (2009), among
others. Recent literature has focused on additional possible implications of trade integration:
an increase in the number of tradable goods (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009), production sharing
(Burstein et al., 2008), more correlated business cycles (Bejan, 2011), or increased foreign direct
investment (Schulz, 2006). In the same vein, international free trade agreements, as promoters
of commercial exchanges and trade, are widely accepted to be a relevant channel to technology
di¤usion (Zhu and Nam Jeon, 2007). Coe et al. (1997) and Schi¤ and Wang (2003) provide
evidence that trade is an important mechanism through which knowledge and technological
progress are transmitted across countries. This is specially true for developing countries that
can learn from the knowledge embedded in the inputs they import. In addition, an increase in
trade fosters demand for payment instruments, since any commercial relationship encompasses
a wide variety of counterparties, transactions and payments (BIS, 1999). Therefore, the way
transactions are paid may change not only operations among the countries participating in these
commercial areas, but also within country deals. Methods of payment of the latter can modify
due to the availability of new payment methods. This may be especially true for less developed
countries entering into a free trade agreement with more developed economies. In this case, the
use of electronic payments would enjoy a reliable and secure infrastructure, extended to the less
developed economy, and allow consumers to use it (Litan and Baily, 2009). The purpose of this
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paper is to study the relationship between trade openness and payment system development. In
particular, the existence of technology spillovers that fosters the switch to electronic payments
that has barely been explored in the literature.
Following the above discussion, this paper models consumer choices regarding di¤erent
payment instruments in the countries participating in a free trade agreement process. The
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, is an example. On January 1, 1994, the NAFTA entered into force. By January 1,
2008 all tari¤s and quotas were eliminated. As highlighted in di¤erent reports, for example
Kose et al. (2004) and CESifo (2010), the e¤ects of NAFTA have been very important in the
Mexican economy, especially in terms of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). In Figure
1 we show the pattern of real FDI from the US into Mexico. We can observe a huge increase
in FDI after the end of the 90s and in particular after 1994. We can see in Figure 2 that
the growth rate of US foreign direct investment into Mexico is positively correlated with the
development of payment infrastructure, measured by the growth rate of the Point-of-Sale (POS)
terminals per capita.1
Figure 1: Evolution of US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Mexico between 1982 and 2010.
1Taking the Automated Clearing Machines (ATM) as a proxy of payment technology, instead, similar rela-
tionship is obtained between FDI and payment technology.
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Figure 2: Correlation between the growth rate of Point-of-Sale (POS) terminals per capita and
the growth rate of US foreign direct investment (FDI) into Mexico between 2001-2010.
In addition, during the start and the operation of NAFTA there appeared other shocks
that might have played a role in trade and payment evolution including: a) the 1994 severe
nancial crisis that forced a sharp devaluation of the peso and the posterior nancial sector
liberalization; b) the broader global cyclical environment, which included a recovery from re-
cessions in the early 1990s, the boom through to the end of the decade and the more recent
global slump and nancial crisis. However, empirical analyses suggest that Mexican banking
sector e¢ ciency did not increase signicantly as a result of foreign banking acquisitions (Schulz,
2006). Moreover, data suggests that NAFTA has spurred a signicant increase in merchandise
trade and foreign investment ows to Mexico (Kose et al., 2004) and has led to a permanent
increase in total factor productivity in Mexicos manufacturing sector through its impact on
trade related technology transfers (Schi¤ and Wang, 2003). The development of information
technology has made international transmission of knowledge faster (Jeon et al., 2005). Accord-
ingly, technology applied to payments have evolved rapidly in Mexico. We show in Figure 3
how the number of POS terminals in Mexico with respect to the average number of terminals
in all three NAFTA countries increased sharply after the trade agreement started to operate.
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Figure 3: Evolution of Point-of-Sale terminals per capita in the USA, Mexico and Canada with
respect to the average number of per capita terminals in all three countries.
Rapid change in the payment dynamics in Mexico is pictured in Figure 4. We can see
that the cash to cards ratio decreased abruptly in Mexico meanwhile the change was milder in
the US and Canada, and the payment technology (represented by POS per capita) increased
about six times faster in Mexico than in the US and Canada. We resume the growth rates of
cash to cards ratios and POS per capita in Table 1. We attribute changes in Mexicos cash to
cards ratio to the NAFTA and its e¤ects on technology development mainly through payment
technology di¤usion.
Figure 4: Change in the cash to cards ratio and payment technology level (number of POS terminals
per thousand inhabitans) between 2001 () and 2010 () (2008 in the US) in the US, Mexico and
Canada.
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Country
Growth rate of
cash/cards ratio
between 2001 and 2010 [%]
Growth rate of
POS per capita
between 2001 and 2010 [%]
Mexico  88 302
USA  54 56
Canada  66 43
Table 1: Change in the cash to cards ratio and POS terminals per capita in Mexico, USA and
Canada between 2001 and 2010 (2008 in the US).
We perform our analysis in the time period 2001-2010 in a theoretical setup based on the
approach of Ireland (1994) and Hromcová (2008). These models predict a switch towards
electronic payments due to economic growth and/or technology development which depends
on economic growth. Mexicos average annual growth rate was very low, in the range of 0,5%
per year, or negative in the period before and during the start of the operation of NAFTA.
Such low growth rate would not explain the fast switch towards electronic means of payment
observed in the data after 2001.
We state the model for two kinds of economies: a more developed and a less developed
country which at certain moment of time open to each other and payment technology is allowed
to ow between them. We calibrate the model to the US and Mexico. We compare the evolution
of cash to cards ratio with technology spillovers from the US to Mexico and without it. We
nd that the increase in technology development due to the technology di¤usion from the more
developed country helps explain the increase in the usage of electronic payment instruments
and an increase of cash to cards ratio. The fact that the less developed country opens may
lead to welfare gains, as better technology means cheaper intermediation services and better
distribution of resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model for less and more developed
country and their main properties using analytical tools are stated in section 2. In Section 3
we calibrate the two groups of countries. In section 4 we discuss the behavior in the transition
and the reaction of the economy to changes in di¤erent parameters. Final conclusions are
summarized in section 5.
2 Model
We consider two economies which are initially closed. They di¤er in the initial level of devel-
opment. Consumers in both economies can use two payment instruments, cash and electronic
transactions. The choice of the payment method at a particular moment of time depends on the
trade-o¤between the opportunity cost of holding money and the cost of electronic transactions.
The existing payment technology depends on the level of capital which represents the achieved
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technology level in a sense of learning-by-doing model, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Level
of development is related to the level of capital. After the trade agreement comes to force,
economies begin to open and there will be spillovers of the payment technology from the more
developed country towards the less developed one. Taking into account that the learning-by-
doing model can be reduced to an AK model, we use for our analysis the model of Ireland
(1994) where we modify the cost of alternative (electronic) payment method, as in Hromcová
(2008). The structure and functioning of both economies is analogous. In the following we
present the model for the economy which begins with lower level of payment technology. We
then generalize the model for the more developed country.
2.1 Less Developed Country
2.1.1 Household Problem
The economy consists of a large number of innitely lived households. They all have identical
preferences, production and trade opportunities. Households inhabit the following environment:
they face continuum of spatially separated markets, which are indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. All
households live in market 0, and the index j indicates the distance from home. In each market
j a distinct perishable good is produced and sold in every period. Goods are thus indexed by j;
which corresponds to the market of both production and trade. The representative household
has the preferences given by the utility function
1X
t=0
t
Z 1
0
ct(j)
1    1
1   dj (1)
where ct(j) is dened as the consumption at period t of the good produced in market j;  > 0
is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and  is the discount factor.
The production and trade is like in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each household is composed
of a worker-shopper pair.
Prior to any trading government xes the gross nominal interest rate R to be constant in
all periods. We will assume that R > 1. Agents enter the period t with certain amount of
monetary balances Zt and the debt Bt; carried over from the previous period, and the capital
stock kt. A representative worker decides to produce on any of the markets j via the net
production function
yt = Akt (2)
where A is the net productivity of capital.2
2Thanks to the AK technology, we can write the net production function as
yt = (A
0 + 1  ) kt:
It corresponds the one dened in the equation (2), where A0 is the marginal productivity and  is the depreciation
of capital.
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First, the goods market opens and consumption takes place. Worker stays at the market j
during the whole period. Shopper visits various markets to acquire consumption goods carrying
all the monetary balances of the household.
Two ways of acquiring consumption goods are allowed: using money or electronic payments.
All goods purchased with government issued money will be referred to as cash goods. Goods
purchased via electronic payments will be referred to as electronic goods.
Nominal monetary balances Zt can be used to buy goods in some of the markets indexed
by j. Cash purchases are subject to the liquidity constraintZ 1
0
[1  t(j)] ct(j)dj 
Zt
pt
; (3)
where t(j) = 0 if a good is purchased on market j with cash, or t(j) = 1 if a good is purchased
on market j via an electronic payment and pt is the price level.
As we have said, agents can use an electronic payment to pay for the consumption. The
nancial intermediary enables electronic payments at a cost t(j) that is given for each market
j and period t. The part of output that is not consumed is devoted to the investment into
capital. After the goods market closes, the monetary holdings of agents are augmented by
a lump sum transfer Xt from the government. The amount Xt is endogenously determined
in the system according to the given nominal interest rate, so that the money demand is
totally satised. As the next step the securities market opens. During the securities trading
session households choose their currency holdings Zt+1: They also purchase (or issue) one-period
nominally denominated pure discount bonds paying Bt+1 units of money at period t+ 1 while
they cost
Bt+1
R
units of money at period t: Bonds are in zero net supply. The budget constraint
agents are facing can be writtenZ 1
0
[ct(j) + t(j)t(j)] dj + kt+1 +
Zt+1
pt
+
Bt+1
Rpt
 Akt + Zt
pt
+
Bt
pt
+
Xt
pt
: (4)
2.1.2 Financial Intermediation
We take the description of the specication of the intermediation cost from Ireland (1994) and
Hromcová (2008). Following Ireland (1994), in order to purchase consumption goods without
cash, some resources must be devoted to making the non-cash payment itself available, checking
the identity of the buyer and his ability to pay. When the shopper is far away from home
(market zero) the communication becomes more di¢ cult, and we assume that the payment
to the intermediary increases with j. Following Hromcová (2008), the real payment made to
the intermediary is characterized by a function that fullls properties found in some empirical
studies: the intermediation cost is lower in richer countries and the cost elasticity is close to
zero (which motivates the proportional intermediation cost).
8
Intermediation function is dened as
t(j) =

j
1  j

ct (j)
!t

(5)
where !t represents the payment technology. Payment technology is better when the technology
level improves, i.e. when capital increases. We assume the payment technology to be equal to
the level of capital in the economy,
!t = kt: (6)
The time dependent part of the intermediation cost embodies the fact that higher purchase
means that more importance should be given to checking the ability of the buyer to pay, thus
its proportionality to consumption purchases.3 It also reects the development of new tech-
nologies in the process of learning-by-doing and resulting more sophisticated payment system
and cheaper intermediation cost.
2.1.3 Payment Choice
Consider a given level of payment technology !t: Given that t(j)
j!1
= 1; whenever R > 1;
households will choose cash goods in markets far away from home (market 0) and electronic
goods in markets close to home. Therefore, there will exist at each time t a market with
cuto¤ index st 2 (0; 1) ; such that in all markets with indexes j < st consumers will use
electronic payments and in all markets with indexes j  st consumers will use cash to acquire
the consumption goods. In the cuto¤ market consumers are indi¤erent between using cash or
electronic payments. We arbitrarily assume that cash will be used at the cuto¤ market.
Dene
ct(j) =
(
c0t (j) when t(j) = 0;
c1t (j) when t(j) = 1:
The functions c0t (j) and c
1
t (j) characterize the cash and electronic consumption per market j;
respectively. We can then write the utility function, budget and cash-in-advance constraint in
a following way
1X
t=1
t
Z st
0
c1t (j)
1    1
1   dj +
Z 1
st
c0t (j)
1    1
1   dj

; (7)
Z st
0

c1t (j) + t(j)

dj +
Z 1
st
c0t (j)dj + kt+1 +
Zt+1
pt
+
Bt+1
Rpt
(8)
 Akt + Zt
pt
+
Bt
pt
+
Xt
pt
3Proportional intermediation cost, apart from being more realistic, as argued in Hromcová (2008), allows for
very elegant numerical solution.
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and Z 1
st
c0t (j)dj 
Zt
pt
: (9)
2.1.4 Equilibrium
Denition: Given the set of initial conditions k1; Z1; B1 and the nominal interest rate R; the
equilibrium consists of sequences fc0t (j); c1t (j); kt+1; Zt+1; Bt+1; st; !t; Xt; ptg1t=1 such that
(a) a representative household is maximizing the discounted utility (7) subject to the budget
constraint (8) and the cash-in-advance constraint (9), choosing the sequences fc0t (j); c1t (j);
kt+1; Zt+1; Bt+1; st; !tg1t=1;
(b) markets for goods, money and bonds clear in every period,
Akt =
Z 1
st
c0t (j)dj +
Z st
0
c1t (j)dj +
Z st
0
t(j)dj + kt+1: (10)
Zt+1 = Zt +Xt; (11)
Bt+1 = 0: (12)
(c) payment technology depends on the level of capital, (6).
Let t and t be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constrain
(8) and the cash-in-advance constraints (9), respectively. The equations that characterize the
equilibrium are the above mentioned market clearing conditions (10), (11), (12) and the rst
order conditions on consumption, capital, nominal balances, nominal bonds and cuto¤ index,
respectively,
c0t (j)
  = t + t; (13)
c1t (j)
  = t; (14)
t = t+1A; (15)
t
pt
= 
t+1 + t+1
pt+1
; (16)
t
pt
= R
t+1
pt+1
; (17)
c0t (st)
1    1
1    
c1t (st)
1    1
1   =  t

c1t (st) + t(st)

+ (t + t)c
0
t (st): (18)
Using (13), (14), (16) and (17), we can rewrite the rst order conditions on both consump-
tions as follows:
c0t (j)
  = Rt; (19)
c1t (j)
  = t: (20)
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From the rst order condition (18) we get the payment to the intermediary to be paid at
the cuto¤ market 4
t (st) =
1
t
"
c1 (t)
1    1
1    
c0 (R; t)
1    1
1  
#
+Rc0 (R; t)  c1 (t) : (21)
Taking into account the expressions (19), (20), and (5), the equilibrium on the goods market
(10) can be rewritten as
Akt =
Z 1
st
c0 (R; t) dj +
Z st
0
c1 (t) dj +
Z st
0
j
1  j
c1 (t)
!t
dj + kt+1: (22)
The current period output is spent between cash consumption, electronic consumption, payment
to the intermediary and investment. The real monetary balances, which equal the amount of
cash consumption purchased in all markets, are
mt = (1  st) c0 (R; t) ; (23)
where
mt =
Zt
pt
: (24)
The consumption via nancial intermediaries, which equal the amount of electronic consump-
tion purchased in all markets, is
et = st c
1 (t) : (25)
The payment to the intermediary is
gt = f st   ln [1  st]g c
1 (t)
!t
; (26)
which represents the resources paid to the intermediary in all markets, where the term in
the brackets is obtained solving the third integral in the equation (22). Considering that the
intermediation cost is dened by the function (5), we can write the cuto¤ index combining (5)
and (21) in the following form
st = s (R;!t) =
 (R)
1
!t
+  (R)
(27)
where
 (R) =
8>>>><>>>>:
lnR for  = 1;

1  
 
1  1
R
1 

!
for  6= 1:
(28)
4The initial level of the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint depends on the monetary policy,
t = t(R); but for simplicity we only write t:
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The cuto¤ index describes the proportion of markets in which agents employ services of the
intermediary. From (15) we can get the evolution of the marginal utility of consumption, we
can see it is constant over time. The ratio of cash to electronic consumption can be expressed
as
mt
et
=
1
!t (R)R
1

: (29)
The payment technology level and the monetary policy a¤ect the composition of the payment
methods.
2.1.5 Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path: Analytical Solution
If the learning-by-doing process leads to an increase in the level of capital, and the consequent
level of payment technology, !t !1; the equation (27) implies that the cuto¤ index approaches
unity, s(R;!t) ! 1: That means that cash is less and less employed when the economy has
more sophisticated payment system, and the ratio of cash to electronic purchases decreases to
0, see equation (29).
In the following proposition we resume the results concerning the long run growth rates of
several variables.
Proposition 1 On the asymptotic balanced growth path the cash consumption and the payment
for the electronic transactions do not grow. The economy and the electronic transactions grow
at the rate (A)
1
 .
Proof. From (15), (20), (25) and (27) we get that the electronic consumption grows at the
rate

t
t+1
 1

: From (19), (23), (27) and (26) we see that the real balances and the payment
to the intermediary do not grow in the long run. The goods market equilibrium (22) rewritten
using (23), (25) and (26),
Akt = mt + et + gt + kt+1
implies that the electronic consumption grows like capital. Capital grows at the same rate as
output.
2.1.6 Transitional Dynamics: Numerical Solution
In order to characterize the dynamics we rewrite the equilibrium equations. We dene
m^t = mt
1

t ; e^t = et
1

t ; g^t = gt
1

t ; (30)
and the sum of transformed expenses on consumption can be written as
f^ (R;!t) = m^t (R;!t) + e^t (R;!t) + g^t (R;!t) : (31)
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The goods market equilibrium (22) implies that it is in fact equal to
f^ (R;!t) = (Akt   kt+1)
1

t :
Then we write the goods market equilibrium for two consecutive periods and get a second order
di¤erence equation for capital
Akt+1   kt+2
Akt   kt+1 = (A)
1

f^(R;!t+1)
f^(R;!t)
: (32)
Because we know the long run characteristics, we will use backward induction to solve the
di¤erence equation in capital (32). We assume that for some high enough level of human capital,
say kT+1  1015; the economy is on its balanced growth path, kT+2kT+1 = limt!1

kt+1
kt

= (A)
1
 :
Then we apply the Newton Raphson method to nd kt knowing kt+1 and kt+2 for all t: In this
way we obtain a numerical policy function kt+1 = K(kt; R): Given the initial level of capital
and the policy function, the behavior of all other variables in the economy can be calculated
from the equations (22)-(28).
2.2 More Developed Country
When writing the version of the model for the more developed country we use the analogous
notation but in capital letters. In Table 2 we resume the notation for both countries involved.
Variable
More developed
country
Less developed
country
level of capital Kt kt
level of payment technology 
t !t
total cash consumption Mt mt
total electronic consumption Et et
cuto¤ market index St st
nominal interest factor (monetary policy) R R
parameter related to the monetary policy (R) (R)
marginal utility of wealth t t
total payment to intermediary Gt gt
net marginal productivity of capital A A
transformed sum of consumption related expenses F^ (R;
t) f^(R;!t)
Table 2: Resume of the notation for both countries.
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2.3 Payment Technology Spillovers
The trade agreement makes the economies gradually open to each other and the payment
technology can ow between countries.5 We consider that after the trade agreement begins to
operate, the payment technology of the less developed economy will receive a pushfrom the
payment system of the more developed country. We assume that the payment technology of the
less developed country is the following combination of the payment technology level achieved
in both economies
!t+1 =
h
(A)
1
   1
i
[(1  )!t + 
t] + !t: (33)
where 0 <   1:6 Recall that the level of payment technology in the more developed economy
depends on its capital, 
t = Kt: Therefore, the growth rate of the payment technology in both
countries converges to the growth rate of capital in the more developed one.
3 Calibration
We calibrate our model using yearly data on Mexico and USA in the time interval close to the
start of the operation of the NAFTA, 1994-2004. This calibration exercise serves us to show
the behavior of the model and see that even such a simple specication can lead to a quite
accurate description of the empirical behavior.
We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to  = 1; and the discount
factor in the utility function  = 0:99; common in both economies. Average growth rate of
GDP per worker in the US is 2%, which implies A 1:03: Average nominal interest rate in the
US is 3%. Monetary policy of the more developed country in the model is thus set to R = 1:03:7
Mexicos growth rate in the stated interval is 0.4%, i.e. the balanced growth path gross growth
rate is 1:004; which implies A1:014: Monetary policy in Mexico is set to R = 1:08:We set the
initial level of capital in the US as to match the cash to cards ratio in 1994. Initial capital in
Mexico is chosen to match the gap in capital between the two countries in the initial year. The
convergence parameter in (33) that ts the data is  = 0:15:
4 Discussion of the Evolution of the Payment Choice
In our baseline model, growth in technologies lowers the intermediation cost and induces a
switch from cash to electronic payments. Mexico experimented crises and periods with negative
5The payment technology can be view in the spirit of technology capital in McGrattan and Prescott (2009).
Once the economies stop being closed, the payment technology can be operated in any location. The adoption
of payment technology, however, may take time.
6This evolution is based on the convergence equation suggested in Lucas (2009).
7Average growth rate of GDP per worker in Canada in the selected interval is the same as in the US, the
Bank of Canada interest rate is slightly higher, about 5%. So if we included Canada in the calibration of the
developed country, the parameter values would not be a¤ected signicantly.
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or very low growth rates that would not explain the switch towards electronic payments. The
model for closed Mexico would predict very slow switch towards electronic payments. However,
in the data we observe an intensive switch towards electronic means of payment. Here we show
how the openness towards a more developed country with higher level of payment technology
may explain that switch.
We simulate the evolution of cash to cards transactions in the more developed and the less
developed countries over time. We assume that the trade agreement starts to operate at a
given time, t = Topen; when the cash to cards ratio in Mexico steeply drops. At t = Topen both
countries open and the payment technology ows from the more developed country towards
the one with lower level of capital and development. Our analysis includes several cases: a)
how the strength of the spillovers in the payment technology a¤ects the payment choice in
the less developed country, b) what would be the behavior of cash/electronic consumption if
the improvement of the payment technology was only due to the development of own new
technologies (linked to the growth rate of the economy), c) how a combination of growth rate
and spillovers modies the evolution of the payment choice.
Figure 5: Evolution of the ratio between cash and electronic consumption in the model for a closed
economy, and for an open economy with di¤erent force of spillovers,  = 0; 0:001; 0:01; 0:1; 0.5 and
1 (see equation (33) for the meaning of the parameter ).
Figure 5 shows how a variation in the level of payment system spillovers changes the agents
choice. When the economy remains closed, it is the growth rate of a country that marks the
pace of transformation of the payment choice. When the economy opens, the updating to the
more developed payment technology makes the cash to electronic ratio converge to the one of
the more developed economy. The speed of convergence is characterized by the strength of
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spillovers (an increase in the parameter  means stronger spillovers and a faster convergence).
In Figure 6 we plot how the growth rate of a country inuences its changes in the cash to cards
ratio. An increase in the less developed countrys growth rate would produce a decrease in the
cash to cards ratio. Figure 6 also tells us that a decrease in the cash to electronic payments
ratio similar to the one observed in the data would occur if Mexico where to increase its growth
rate way above 10%, an event not observed in reality.
Figure 6: Evolution of the ratio between cash and electronic consumption in the model for a closed
and open economy with di¤erent balanced growth path growth rates, g = 1:004; 1.01, 1.02, 1.1, for
 = 0:15; cs=closed, op=open.
Figure 7: Evolution of the ratio between cash and electronic consumption in the less developed
economy, closed and open, and the more developed economy in the model, and the comparison to the
data, Topen= 8 (yearopen= 2002).
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Using our baseline calibration we can match the evolution of cash/electronic goods in the
data of Mexico and the US, see Figure 7. After opening, technology ows from the more de-
veloped country to the less developed one. This means that the level of payment technology
in the less developed country, !t; increases and the intermediation cost decreases, see equation
(5). Cheaper intermediation cost implies that less resources are channeled towards the inter-
mediaries, and more resources can be used for consumption. The total consumption, cash and
electronic, mt+ et; in the less developed economy when open and closed is plotted in Figure 8.
We thus see that welfare gains may be associated to openness and the resulting drop in cash
to cards ratio.
Figure 8: Evolution of total consumption, mt+et; in the less developed economy when closed and
open at Topen = 8; for the baseline calibration for Mexico.
5 Conclusions
Recent theoretical models have highlighted the relevance of trade in di¤erent economic di-
mensions. This paper focuses on payment systems. It investigates how technology spillovers
transmit through international trade and enhance the development of payment systems instru-
ments. In particular, the model predicts a signicant drop in the usage of cash after the less
developed trading partner involves fully in an open trade agreement with the developed one.
Actually, the degree of convergence depends on the intensity of payment technology di¤usion.
The model is calibrated using data from Mexico. Further, although economic growth is con-
sidered to spur card usage as well, we show that in the case of Mexico, this was not enough to
explain the increasing trend in electronic means of payments usage. We also show that reduc-
tions in intermediation costs have positive e¤ects on consumption. Therefore, those countries
who want to intensify technology spillovers should consider very seriously a trade liberalization.
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